European leaders will have to build better defenses against pressures and coercion from abroad, ensure a functioning transatlantic relationship to successfully manage relations with a rising China, and promote effective multilateralism. According to the Pew Research Center, more than half of the states in the world are democracies of some sort and only 13 percent are autocracies. A system of multilateral institutions established under U.S. leadership in the 1940s and 1950s aimed to spread these values globally. Its share of global GDP might decline by half in the same time frame. In terms of foreign policy, the EU would avoid power struggles in distant parts of the world and instead focus on maintaining stability and managing migration in its neighborhood. All Rights Reserved. The emergence of miniature civilization states within the EU does not help; Hungary and Poland have become increasingly critical of the universalist agenda and instead promote their own national values and identity. But this letter was soon followed by another letter ultimately signed by fifty states that commended China for its achievement in human rights and opposed the “practice of politicizing human rights, by naming and shaming, and exerting pressure on other countries.” China is skillfully using the leverage of its economic relationships to assemble a broad coalition against the universalist philosophy. The urgent need for more effective multilateral cooperation has rarely been as apparent as it is now—particularly for defeating the pandemic, combating climate change, and maximizing the benefits of digitalization while mitigating the risks. The EU will try hard to avoid taking sides, but if it has to, it will end up supporting the United States. Above all, representatives of civilization states reject a form of accountability that transcends national borders. The Irish Data Protection Commission (IDPC) has commenced an inquiry into Facebook controlled EU-US data transfers, and has suggested that SCCs cannot in practice be used for EU-US data transfers. Conclusion Bibliography As the U.S. focus on the Indo-Pacific intensifies, the roles of the United States and Europe could change, leading Europe, with U.S. support, to assume greater responsibilities in its own neighborhood. Macron made clear that European sovereignty would not supplant national sovereignty in the sense of building a European state but rather complement and enhance it. A union asserting itself in an environment of identity politics would ideally affirm its own well-defined identity. In international forums that discuss human rights, the West is now on the defensive. Now politicians tend to focus on developing European sovereignty, ensuring strategic autonomy, and protecting the European way of life. It’s therefore useful to explore possible strategic options for the EU’s global engagement. Still, it is hard to imagine that the global amalgamation of modes of life will not over time make the claims of some states to represent distinct civilizations with their own separate value systems hard to sustain. “The referendum on membership of the EU offers the UK a once-in-a-generation opportunity to assess critically its role in the world today, and to decide what kind of foreign policy actor it seeks to become in future.”. Trade and other economic policies, which used to be engines of progressive liberalization, are now being recast to protect the EU from potential harmful influences from China and other rising foreign powers. With few exceptions, only politicians on the nationalist right like to use this terminology. This report is published annually by the Institute for Economics and Peace, “an independent, non-partisan, non-profit organization dedicated to shifting the world’s focus to peace as a positive, achievable and tangible measure of human wellbeing and progress.” They would see the gradual emergence of several regional trading blocs—one centered around the EU—as a positive development. China is the EU’s second most important economic partner. Also, the Cold War was principally about Europe, so while the United States led the response, its European allies had considerable input into the shaping of U.S. policy. Globalization has weakened in recent years but is unlikely to be reversed altogether. The bloc’s confident self-image as a role model and vanguard of a renewed rules-based international order has been replaced by a defensive attitude, lower ambitions, and a more narrow regional focus. The safeguard procedure is slightly different from anti-dumping and anti-subsidy, and the decision to apply safeguards always has to be weighed very carefully. The West’s hopes that a rising middle class in China would quickly lead to Western-style democratization were clearly misguided. Europe should wisely use its (limited) influence to mitigate the rivalry and to preserve as much cooperation as possible with, as well as between, the two antagonists. Discourse about the EU’s place in the world has changed over the past decade. Many Europeans who sorely missed U.S. leadership over the past few years would welcome a revival of the West. This capacity will be crucial for solving the global challenges confronting the world today. Europe’s changed mood partly reflects a genuine rebalancing of global influence. Instead, while some of them pay lip service to democratic governance, the rule of law, and respect for human rights, they insist on their own interpretation of these principles. Initiatives such as the Alliance for Multilateralism, launched by France and Germany, are steps in the right direction. The U.S.-China rivalry will almost certainly become the defining characteristic of this decade and possibly the next one. However, the hope that countries around the world would embrace the universalist credo turned out to be an illusion. Already today, downtown areas in big cities share similarities. Analysts such as Bruno Maçães and Christopher Coker have identified the rise of the civilization state as one of the key challenges to the liberal agenda. By comparison, the U.S.-China rivalry will be about the Indo-Pacific, and Washington might not listen closely to what European capitals have to say about it. This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data by a controller not established in the Union, but in a place where Member State law applies by virtue of public international law. But given the dynamics of change and the interdependencies of the modern world, this is not a viable option. Very crudely, three basic strategic options could secure the EU’s position in the world: However, revived multilateralism will look different from the twentieth-century version. The notion of a “European civilization” is tarnished, as it served for centuries to propagate European supremacy and legitimize colonialism. EU relations with the rest of the world Some of its partners probably don’t need much convincing. However, there is a fine line between protection and protectionism and between strengthening autonomy and turning against interdependence. But to do so requires pragmatism and compromise from both sides. As vaccine production falls behind schedule, and the European Union lags in inoculating people, Brussels and London are lobbing threats and accusations at each other. Von der Leyen has said she will lead a “geopolitical Commission,” but as a diverse multilevel entity held together by law and values, the EU will never be very good at geopolitics. Check your email for details on your request. Of Friends and Foes in the Fight Against Terrorism: NATO and the Politics of Norm Promotion in the 21st Century 4. Since the end of World War II, Western countries have promoted a set of universal principles, including democracy, respect for fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, as well as free trade and a liberal market economy, which in their view serve as foundations of a rules-based world order. When asked what she meant by the European way of life, von der Leyen referred to Article 2 of the EU treaty, where the values of the EU (for example, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law) are enshrined. Also, the Cold War was principally about Europe, so while the United States led the response, its European allies had considerable input into the shaping of U.S. policy. 1. Carnegie–Tsinghua Young Ambassadors Program, G7 group of the world’s biggest economies, Macron made clear that European sovereignty, opposition from center-left and liberal parties, Reinventing the West while containing China. Faced with the heterogeneity of its membership and the fragmentation of its politics, the EU is unlikely to clarify its identity for the foreseeable future. Its comparative advantage lies in its ability to resolve controversial issues through fact-based dialogue and results-oriented negotiations. In light of growing challenges and the negative developments in several countries, the EU should strengthen its policy and stand up for the rig… While most in the survey are downbeat about the European Union’s recent track record within Europe, they have a more optimistic view of the EU’s future global role. Faced with the heterogeneity of its membership and the fragmentation of its politics, the EU is unlikely to clarify its identity for the foreseeable future. Multilateralism is far from being a novel concept. For decades, sovereignty has been the banner under which nationalists have marched against European integration. The EU cannot, on the one hand, insist that these values are universally shared by all humankind and, on the other hand, claim that they form the unique essence of Europe’s identity. But most of all, the EU will have to maintain an open and constructive outlook that perceives interdependence not as a threat but as an opportunity to resolve common challenges through collective action. The recent election of Joe Biden as the next president of the United States will not end the rivalry but rather change the nature of it. The EU’s international role will also be debated but is unlikely to feature high on the agenda. However, today’s increasing diversification of multilateral actors and of multilateral playing fields means that this conception of international relations no longer accurately depicts reality. A closer look at today’s reality reveals that the universalist agenda is in trouble but not dead. Of course, a convergence of lifestyles driven by economic and technological developments and by mobility and cultural exchanges does not automatically translate into shared universalist politics. Internet platforms bring people together but also polarize societies and drive fragmentation. A graceful management of European decline will bump up against the harsh realities of unresolved global challenges ranging from the climate transition to digitalization. Still, to set the right priorities and avoid a clash in interests, it will be useful for the EU to discuss what the fundamental orientation of its external policy should be. But most of all, the EU will have to maintain an open and constructive outlook that perceives interdependence not as a threat but as an opportunity to resolve common challenges through collective action. As the United States reduced its global footprint for reasons of both will and capacity, many countries reverted to traditional forms of power politics, triggering competitions for regional hegemony. Yet, realistically, the future of Europe will to a large extent depend on the evolving global constellation of forces and on the way the EU chooses to position itself. Today, identity politics threaten the EU’s universalist philosophy, and the decline of Europe’s political and economic power threatens to turn the region into a playing field rather than a player. Though China and the United States have different societal preferences and values, China so far shows little inclination to export its ideology to other parts of the world. The West’s hopes that a rising middle class in China would quickly lead to Western-style democratization were clearly misguided. 1000 Brussels, Belgium, Phone: +32 2 735 56 50 However, this new transatlantic relationship would be distinctly different from the earlier U.S.-European partnership during the Cold War. Attitudes toward migration and asylum are increasingly marked by a fortress Europe mindset, with most governments prioritizing the security of external borders above all other objectives. But Thermo Fisher this week said it had done what it was obliged to under its contract with the drugmaker. It is the general rule for all decisions concerning EU’ s Foreign and security policy, with each EU Member State having equal vote. For decades, sovereignty has been the banner under which nationalists have marched against European integration. Their objection to the West’s universalist message doesn’t relate to market economic principles, even though they generally favor a stronger role for the state than one finds in developed Western economies. Analysts such as Bruno Maçães and Christopher Coker have identified the rise of the civilization state as one of the key challenges to the liberal agenda. Realistically, because foreign policy is complex and constantly evolving, the EU will need to pursue elements of all three strategic options. And in political terms, there is a widespread sense of vulnerability and loneliness: “The times in which we could completely depend on others are on the way out” and “we Europeans have to take our destiny into our own hands,” as German Chancellor Angela Merkel has put it. European politicians used to speak about foreign policy in terms of building a global liberal order, strengthening the transatlantic partnership, and safeguarding effective multilateralism. Facing an ongoing shift in global forces, an aging European population might just hope for a comfortable retirement at the margins of world politics. Stay connected to Judy Dempsey's Strategic Europe with a new smartphone app for Android and iOS devices, Carnegie Europe Good relations with the rest of the world are beneficial to the EU’s economic, political, social and cultural development. At the same time, the cooperation must be more equitable, meaning that Europe must address its overrepresentation in some bodies and enable more systematic involvement of civil society. Second, an excessive emphasis on protection and defense might harm the EU’s open and liberal outlook. 3 Europeans want the EU to play a bigger role on the world stage. But it also underlines that there is progress in some parts of the world and that the desire for freedom and democratic governance among civil society is as strong as ever. And while cultural influences used to be one-sided—mostly coming from the United States—this is rapidly changing. Very crudely, three basic strategic options could secure the EU’s position in the world: • Reinventing the West while containing China. Europe’s changed mood partly reflects a genuine rebalancing of global influence. But this letter was soon followed by another letter ultimately signed by fifty states that commended China for its achievement in human rights and opposed the “practice of politicizing human rights, by naming and shaming, and exerting pressure on other countries.” China is skillfully using the leverage of its economic relationships to assemble a broad coalition against the universalist philosophy. Most obviously, the WHO Euro region consists of 53 countries, almost twice the number of EU member states — and crucially, some of those neighbors harbor alarming levels of infectious disease that pose a serious challenge to the EU28. Because Schinas would also supervise the migration portfolio, parliamentarians worried that protecting the European way of life would in effect mean keeping migrants out. The global wave of democratization that characterized the 1990s and early 2000s lost momentum. The three policy options presented above are not mutually exclusive. A closer look at today’s reality reveals that the universalist agenda is in trouble but not dead. At a time when the United States and China tend to weaponize their economic and financial power through extraterritorial sanctions and threats to limit access to markets, there is an excellent case for strengthening resilience and developing instruments to counter hostile action. Some places in the world even have the problem of "career criminals" worsened by the fact that those released from prison cannot find good jobs. Of course, votes in the UN are neither a good way of establishing the validity of a viewpoint nor an accurate reflection of the constellation of powers. While Europe will likely continue to offer a comparatively high quality of life, its overall weight on the global scale is bound to decline, as other countries catch up or move ahead. The sovereignty narrative can easily become part of a defensive mindset that calls into question the liberal worldview that has characterized EU politics for decades. The Cold War was largely a fight over different ideas for organizing society; this time, the fight will be mainly about power and control. Discussions are expected to focus on topics that matter most to European citizens, such as healthcare, the environment, social equality, innovation, digital transformation, and EU democracy. According to them, the idea of a single normative order did not survive the shift of world power toward Asia. When taking into account international governmental and nongovernmental institutions, media, and top educational establishments, the Western approach to rules and norms still appears reasonably robust. Numerous states are now in the hands of strongman rulers such as Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro. Its share of global GDP might decline by half in the same time frame. It is true that self-styled civilization states rejecting universalist values are wielding greater power than before, but these countries are still few in number. Siding with the United States will not come easy, however, and will carry important economic costs. So far, safeguards have only been used sparingly by the EU. Relaunching multilateralism together with like-minded partners around the world should therefore remain at the center of Europe’s foreign policy. Even some of the most successful Asian countries—including Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan—have open societies espousing universalist principles. Introduction. But it also underlines that there is progress in some parts of the world and that the desire for freedom and democratic governance among civil society is as strong as ever. Using a different methodology, Freedom House notes an overall decline in global freedom beginning in 2006, currently aggravated by the coronavirus pandemic. However, two risks must be avoided. However, two risks must be avoided. How India is Trying to Police the Internet, Rajapaksa’s Stranglehold Choking Sri Lankan Democracy. They can empower citizens and make authorities more accountable but also spread disinformation and facilitate surveillance. This article was originally published on Carnegie Europe.Views in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect CGS policy. In June 2020, the UN Human Rights Council passed—against the votes of most European members—a resolution China introduced, titled “promoting mutually beneficial cooperation in the field of human rights.” The resolution will likely refocus UN work on technical cooperation and capability building at the cost of accountability. Nonetheless, it’s useful to separately discuss the options, as it may clarify their respective risks, costs, and benefits and also help set priorities for the EU’s engagement with the world. effectively implement and consolidate the legal instruments and policy measures in place. Protecting the European way of life seems to be a more acceptable though vague formula to express the need to safeguard Europe’s identity. European elites worry that the EU might be left behind by economic and technological progress and become a rule follower rather than a rule maker. Today’s more challenging international environment obviously requires the EU to design more robust policies and build its capacity to defend Europe’s interests. Europe should wisely use its (limited) influence to mitigate the rivalry and to preserve as much cooperation as possible with, as well as between, the two antagonists. And, in fact, EU institutions are working on measures to achieve these aims. The U.S.-China rivalry will almost certainly become the defining characteristic of this decade and possibly the next one. This capacity will be crucial for solving the global challenges confronting the world today. Additional U.S. pressure could deepen these divisions further. In many Asian and African countries, the resentment against what they perceive as interference by their former colonial masters is widespread. If the EU focuses all its attention on defending the status quo, it will lose its ability to shape the future. If the EU decides to step up its support for a rules-based international order, it will have to increase its investment in international regimes and organizations and show leadership in mobilizing like-minded countries. For example, people living in London, Shanghai, Sydney, and Vancouver can choose from an eclectic range of food, fashion, culture, and architecture. China is determined to become the leading power in the Indo-Pacific and to enhance its clout elsewhere, whereas the United States is determined to contain this development. However, when the Cold War ended, the road toward a truly global order founded on universalist principles seemed to open up. Using a different methodology, Freedom House notes an overall decline in global freedom beginning in 2006, currently aggravated by the coronavirus pandemic. For several decades, the Soviet bloc and parts of the developing world pushed back, propagating an alternative world view. While the concept’s meaning was never fully explained, it could be characterized as self-determination—the ability to resist external coercion and retain the capacity for autonomous action. Some of its partners probably don’t need much convincing. EU relations with the rest of the world. But a second reason for the shifting mood is that the universalist philosophy that had informed European and North American global diplomacy for decades has run into trouble. Consequently there is also an urgent need for a laboratory training China, India, Russia, and Turkey view themselves not as nation states cast in the European model but as civilization states that promote and defend their distinct way of life. You are leaving the Carnegie–Tsinghua Center for Global Policy's website and entering another Carnegie global site. Siding with the United States will not come easy, however, and will carry important economic costs. As the United States reduced its global footprint for reasons of both will and capacity, many countries reverted to traditional forms of power politics, triggering competitions for regional hegemony. China is the EU’s second most important economic partner. By the end of the century, the EU’s share of the world population is expected to shrink from 6 to 4 percent. While this approach is subject to further process, if followed, it could have a far reaching effect on businesses that rely on SCCs and on the online services many people and businesses rely on. One of the key elements of the EU’s security architecture is consensus (unanimity). Even so, while Europe and the United States have similar economic and security concerns overall and could agree on a joint agenda on China, the long-term goals of their policies might be quite different. As the U.S. focus on the Indo-Pacific intensifies, the roles of the United States and Europe could change, leading Europe, with U.S. support, to assume greater responsibilities in its own neighborhood. The Conference on the Future of Europe would be an excellent occasion to do so. Already today, downtown areas in big cities share similarities.
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